Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 3

Article 10

1992

Florida Supreme Court Bases Probate Attorney's
Fees on Reasonable Rate, Not Fixed Percentage
Clarinda Gipson

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Clarinda Gipson Florida Supreme Court Bases Probate Attorney's Fees on Reasonable Rate, Not Fixed Percentage, 4 Loy. Consumer L. Rev.
103 (1992).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol4/iss3/10

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Collins argued that her losses
were not economic because a distinction could be made between
those losses due to Legner's breach
of the installment contract and
those due to Reynard's negligence.
Collins stated that she sought only
to recover the losses incurred because of Reynard's negligence,
rather than for amounts due under
her contract with Legner. The
court, however, found no distinction. Regardless of the terminology
used, Collins sought to recover
economic losses in the amount due
under the contract, including the
principal, interest, cost of collection, and attorney fees.
Losses Do Not Fit an Exception
Having concluded that Collins
sought only economic damages,
the court then considered whether
recovery of economic loss in tort
cases, including legal malpractice,
could be based on negligence. The
leading case in this area, Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. National
Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982),
rejected a products liability complaint seeking solely economic loss
under the tort theories of strict
liability, negligence, or innocent
misrepresentation. However, the
decision set forth two exceptions,
making economic losses recoverable when: (1) a person intentionally made false representations; or
(2) when a person in the business of
supplying information to guide
others in their business transactions made a negligent representation.
The court here found Reynard's
conduct did not fall within either
exception, as neither intentional
nor negligent misrepresentation
was alleged. Further, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that
the second exception does not apply to lawyers, but to suppliers of
information such as surveyors,
newspapers, accountants, and
credit bureaus.
Thus, the court found that recovery for economic loss under
legal malpractice was limited to
instances in which the attorney
owed a duty not only to the client,
but also to individuals that the
client intended to benefit. The limited exception was inapplicable in
this case because there was no
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evidence that Reynard breached
any extracontractual duty owed to
Collins.

issued as of publication.
Stacy Feldman

Contract, not Tort, Proper
Cause of Action
The court noted that the denial
of Collin's tort claim did not lead
to an unjust result because Collins
still had a pending contract claim.
The court stated that contract law
provided a better basis than tort
law for the resolution of cases
concerning the failed expectations
of clients when the only losses
sought to be recovered are economic. Contract law applies to the
obligations that parties voluntarily
undertake and their mutual expectations. Tort law, in contrast, imposes a standard of conduct designed to protect third parties from
unreasonable risk. Failure to conform to the standard creates liability, even in the absence of a contract. Here, Collins freely entered
into the contractual relationship
with Reynard, and no further duties existed. Therefore, a contract
action was the appropriate route
for Collins to pursue.
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The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Miller's dissent argued that the majority improperly
abandoned an established body of
case law. Prior to this case, tort law
had been recognized as a proper
ground for recovery of malpractice
actions, and courts had given no
indication that tort-based recovery
was improper.
The dissent also stated that it
was inappropriate to place attorney malpractice actions within the
Moorman doctrine. Throughout
its development, the doctrine had
denied tort remedies to a party
whose complaint was rooted in
disappointed contractual or commercial expectations. The theory
behind denying recovery was that
the party could have bargained for
a guarantee or warranty against the
type of harm suffered. Applying
the theory behind the Moorman
doctrine to the area of legal representation was difficult, however,
because attorneys rarely will guarantee or promise a particular result
to a client.
Rehearing was granted on February 3, 1992. No opinion has been

In In Re Estate of Platt, 586

So.2d 328 (Fla. 1991), the Supreme
Court of Florida held that in probate or condemnation procedures,
attorney and personal representative fees could not be calculated as
a percentage of the estate's value.
Rather, reasonable fees should be
assessed by applying the state statute governing attorney's fees,
which allows consideration of an
hourly rate.
Background
For the two years prior to his
death, Lester Platt ("Platt") was
incompetent. His attorney, George
A. Patterson ("Patterson"), and
NCNB National Bank ("NCNB")
served as his co-personal representatives, and were compensated accordingly. Platt died leaving his
two children, Patricia Platt Faulkner and Barbara Platt Swanson
("Daughters") as the beneficiaries
of his seven million dollar estate.
At the beginning of probate,
Patterson and NCNB advised the
beneficiaries that their co-personal
representative fees and attorney's
fees would be 4.5 percent of the
Platt estate, or approximately
$315,000. The Daughters objected
to this method of payment and
instead requested that Patterson
and NCNB keep accurate time
records of their services.
When probate closed two years
later, Patterson and NCNB sought
fees totalling $489,877, about 6
percent of the value of Platt's estate. Patterson requested $144,300
for attorney's fees and $92,500 for
his co-personal representative role.
The bulk of Patterson's staff services consisted of typing and
proofreading services. NCNB
sought a fee for its work as corporate representative, plus an additional sum for extraordinary services. The Daughters asked the
(continued on page 104)
103

Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Attorney's Fees
(continued from page 103)

district court to determine the appropriate compensation.
Trial and Appellate Opinions
The trial court found that the
percentage fees were reasonable. It
granted Patterson's request for attorney's fees but reduced his corepresentative earnings. The court
also awarded NCNB's sum as corporate representative, but denied
NCNB's compensation request for
extraordinary services.
The Daughters appealed to the
Fourth District Court of Appeals
and argued that the trial court had
incorrectly applied the statute governing probate fees. They contended
that section 733.617, Florida Statutes (1987), detailed several factors
to consider in order to set these type
of fees, one of which was the
amount of time and effort involved
in representing the client. The
Daughters further argued that nothing in the provisions of section
733.617 prevented the application
of an hourly rate to help assess a
reasonable fee. The appellate court,
however, upheld the trial court's
assignment of fees based on the
value of the decedent's estate. The
Daughters appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court.
Reasonable Fee is Correct

Standard
The Supreme Court of Florida
examined the legislative history of
section 733.617 to ascertain
whether a sliding percentage scale
was the appropriate method for
calculating compensation. The section's predecessor statute expressly
provided for a sliding percentage
fee scale based on the size of the
estate handled by the attorney.
However, in 1974 this section was
replaced, and attorneys and other
professionals were to receive reasonable compensation for their services, rather than a percentage of
the estate. The factors later added
to assist a trial judge in determining reasonable fees included,
among others, consideration of: (1)
the time and labor involved in the
case and the skills needed to provide the service; (2) the restrictions
placed on other employment while
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providing the service; (3) the fees
customarily charged in the community for comparable service; (4)
the nature and duration of the
relationship between the professional and the decedent; and (5)
the amount of time and effort
involved and the results obtained.
The Florida Legislature instructed
that one or more of these factors
should be used to determine reasonable compensation.
Consequently, the Florida Supreme Court found that legislative
intent dictated that a reasonable
fee, not a percentage rate, should
be the standard used to determine
compensation. The court recognized that since section 733.617
applied to various professionals
employed to handle an estate, all
provisions would not apply to all
professional categories. However,
all factors which applied to a specific category of professionals
should be consistently applied
within that profession so that a
reasonable fee in one case would be
consistent with others fees in similar cases. Thus, the court reasoned
that the value of an estate should
not be the controlling factor, but
one of several elements for attorneys to consider when determining
fees.
Goal is Consistent Results
The court explicitly rejected an
argument proposed by the Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section of the Florida Bar, which
presented a supplemental brief in
support of Patterson. The court
disagreed that the "one or more of
the following" language in the statute permitted a judge to find attorney's fees based on the value of the
estate alone or in combination
with any of the other factors listed
under section 733.617. The Florida Supreme Court stated that allowing such random assessments
among judges would leave the public without consistent results in
probate cases.
Hourly Rate Part of Determination

Lastly, the court held that the
hourly rate approach should be
employed to help ascertain a reasonable attorney's fee because this
method mirrored the approach to
fee assessment taken in section

733.617. In this case, however, the
trial court's records were unclear as
to which of the services provided
by Patterson's staff should be categorized as attorney's fees and
which should be considered additional fees. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court remanded the case
back to the trial court for conclusive determinations.
Clarinda Gipson

California Holds Ski Lift
Operators to Higher
Standard of Care in Tort
Cases
In Squaw Valley Ski Corporation
v. Superior Court of Placer County,
3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992), the California Court of Appeals for the Third District held
that ski lift operators are common
carriers and therefore are held to a
higher standard of care for the
purpose of determining liability in
tort cases.
Background
Squaw Valley Ski Corporation
("Squaw Valley") operates skiing
facilities in California. In order to
use Squaw Valley ski lifts, patrons
must have skis, bindings, boots,
and valid lift passes. Patricia
Bowles ("Bowles"), having complied with these requirements, approached one of Squaw Valley's
chair lifts in April of 1986. As she
attempted to board, a chair struck
Bowles in the head causing injuries.
Bowles sued Squaw Valley in the
Superior Court of Placer County,
California, asserting that the company negligently operated the ski
lift because no employees were
present to help patrons board. Prior to trial, Bowles asked the court
to establish that Squaw Valley was
a common carrier for the purpose
of determining tort liability.
The basic standard of care in
negligence cases is ordinary care,
the measures a reasonable, prudent
person would use under the circumstances. A common carrier, on
the other hand, is held to a higher
standard of care because a California liability statute imposes a duty
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